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Introduction
Patterns of health and disease have been relevant to international studies for as long 
as human populations have migrated across large territorial spaces, and the history 
of international organization, to protect and promote human health, can be traced 
to ancient times. Major disease epidemics, notably those causing large-scale morbidity 
and mortality, led to the creation of formal institutional arrangements to support 
health cooperation. The Plague of Athens during the second year of the Peloponnesian 
War (430 bc), Black Death that swept through Europe in the 1340s, cholera epidemics 
during the Industrial Revolution, and the influenza pandemic after World War I, for 
example, all prompted efforts to strengthen collective action. The resultant institu-
tional arrangements included the International Sanitary Conferences, the Office 
International d’Hygiène Publique, the Health Organization of the League of Nations, 
and various regional bodies.
After World War II, international health cooperation was identified as a key func-
tion of the United Nations (UN), leading to the establishment of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) as the UN specialized agency for health. Over the next several 
decades, other UN bodies developed substantial health-related activities, such as the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This was accom-
panied by a growth in funding and activities by bilateral aid agencies, along with a 
substantial number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). By the 1980s, the 
World Bank and regional development banks began to lend substantial sums for 
health development, as well as to shape international health policy. This expansion 
of international health cooperation reflected a broad definition of “health,” and 
recognition of the range of factors contributing to patterns of health and disease.
Since the mid-1990s, there has been an explosion of international institutional 
arrangements to protect and promote health. International health organizations now 
embrace intergovernmental, nongovernmental and private (for profit) organizations, 
in many cases innovatively combined into “public–private partnerships” such as the 
Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM). Correspondingly, 
the study of international organization and health has grown rapidly, as a subject in 
itself, and as a means of understanding broader themes in international relations.
The Postwar Study of International Health Cooperation
Broadly speaking, the study of international organization and health to the 1970s is 
surprisingly thin despite the boom in international organization scholarship as a whole 
during this period. The main source of detailed analyses of international health 
cooperation dating before 1945 is medical historians, notably the seminal A History 
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of Public Health by Rosen (1958). Despite the long history of international health 
cooperation, perhaps representing the earliest forms of intersocietal cooperation, 
postwar scholars of international organization largely neglected this subject area. In 
part, this may reflect the secondary attention given to health by the architects of 
the UN system. As disease rates soared among military and civilian populations in the 
immediate aftermath of conflict, and many countries faced the rebuilding of basic 
infrastructure, including health systems, there was clear recognition of the importance 
of international health cooperation. Yet the higher priority given by major powers to 
peace and security, and economic stability and reconstruction, led to health being 
omitted from the agenda of the UN Conference on International Organization of 
1945. As Murphy writes, while the US “took charge of the conferences concerned 
with managing potential conflicts generated by the industrial system,” namely the 
Bretton Woods institutions, countries occupied during the war “had to be content 
with sponsoring conferences that strengthened society” (1994:185). This gave the 
impression that international health cooperation was something of an afterthought, 
with China and Brazil initiating the International Health Conference of 1946 which 
led to the formal creation of WHO in 1948.
The scholarly neglect of international organization and health during this period 
might also be attributed to the widely held perception that the work of WHO and 
other health-related international organizations is highly technical (and by extension 
apolitical), and thus outside the boundaries of international studies. This view fit with 
the prevailing notion of UN specialized agencies as embodying “the functional 
approach [which] circumvents ideological and radical divisions, as it does territorial 
frontiers” (Mitrany 1975:226). Where health issues strayed into politics, this was deemed 
within the realm of domestic social policy (“low politics”), and thus outside the intel-
lectual boundaries of mainstream international relations.
Early accounts of WHO were commissioned by the organization itself (WHO 1958; 
1968), or written by former senior officials (Chisholm 1951), consultants (Winslow 
1951; Clements 1952) or legal experts (Sharp 1947; Levy 1954; Alexandrowijz 1962). 
Much of this work was published within the fields of public health or law, rather than 
international relations, focused on the technical or procedural niceties of the organ-
ization’s activities. While offering valuable insights into the internal workings of the 
organization, for the most part these accounts primarily serve as a description of 
administrative processes and major activities.
Notable exceptions to this early writing are several studies which analyze the struc-
ture, functions, financing, and membership of WHO. Written during a period of 
postwar optimism toward the potential for international organization to promote 
human welfare, combined with major strides in medical science, their focus was 
identifying the appropriate institutional means for achieving collective ends. The 
decentralized structure of WHO’s six regional offices attracted particular attention as 
a model for building international public administration. For example, Berkov analyzes 
“the manner in which [WHO] is administered, to note how it executes its programs 
by means of regional arrangements virtually unique in the international field, and to 
judge – as far as may be possible – the effect [. . .] which its structure and procedures 
have had upon the programs which it administers” (1957:2). He concludes that, 
despite the greater cost and risks of organizational fragmentation, the decentralized 
structure of WHO has enabled the organization to adapt its program to meet the needs 
of member states; member states to “feel themselves less separated from the source of 
control, and more readily regard the WHO as an organization in which they have 
a direct interest,” and WHO to collect necessary information from the country level 
for “greater ease of coordinating projects.” Gutteridge (1963) saw international health 
organizations as a functional extension of the “creation and maintenance of a proper 
organization at the national and local levels in which those directly responsible for 
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the promotion of public health, including members of the public itself, can work 
effectively.”
Refining the Mandate and Functions of International Health Organizations
Underlying disagreement about WHO’s appropriate mandate remained the subject 
of extensive and ongoing scholarly debate among policy makers and scholars of the 
day. Advocates of social medicine, which seeks to understand and foster the social 
and economic conditions that lead to healthier societies, envisioned WHO addressing 
the broad determinants of health. Its mandate would thus go beyond the limited 
functions of previous international health organizations which focused on disease 
surveillance and reporting. Others argued for a biomedically defined mandate focused 
on fighting selected diseases using scientific and technical tools. During the im-
mediate postwar period, this disagreement delayed the formal establishment of 
WHO (Lee 2008). Within the scholarly literature, this tension between support for 
six disease-focused “priority projects” and “strengthening health services” and “technical 
assistance” is recognized by Ascher in his analysis of “Current Problems in the World 
Health Organization’s Program” (1952:31).
While recognizing the clash within public health between biomedicine and social 
medicine, the normative basis of medical knowledge and practice was not interrogated 
per se, during this period of scholarship, but instead assumed to be value-neutral and 
unproblematic. This is not to say that scholars did not recognize that political power 
struggles took place. In WHO, for example, the tensions between headquarters and 
regional offices over resources, authority, and the eventual work program were acknow-
ledged (Calderwood 1963). Moreover, the geopolitics of the broader UN system was 
seen as intruding on the universality of membership of WHO and, by extension, its 
higher order values of protecting and promoting human health (Allen 1950). For 
example, Ascher writes:
So long as membership in WHO is open only to states, there will always be politics in 
the formulation and execution of its work-plan. That is, decisions will be influenced by 
forces other than the dictates of medical science. Scientists can secrete unnecessary 
adrenalin over this and raise their blood pressure; but the mature and worldly among 
them will address themselves more subtly t]o the question of how politics can be kept 
in its proper sphere in WHO’s work. (1952:41)
Similarly, public health historian Fraser Brockington (a consultant for WHO and 
ambassador for the organization upon his retirement) argued in his book World 
Health (1975) that WHO was a creature of its member states, and shortfalls in its 
capacity to reach consensus and support clear international health goals should be 
laid at the feet of governments. As a largely descriptive account of WHO’s creation 
and work, the book attributes problems in fulfilling WHO’s mandate to the state of 
knowledge, inadequate resources, and insufficient political will. This perception 
of politics intruding on the essentially technical nature of WHO’s work also underlies 
the writing of Frank Gutteridge (then chief of WHO’s Legal Office) in his analysis 
of decision making. He writes that “compliance has been sought through persuasion 
[non-binding resolutions and recommendations based on scientific or technical advice 
of its expert committees] rather than by the introduction of any direct procedures 
[i.e., binding regulation].” This, he argues, is an appropriate and effective approach 
given that:
The background of the general policy of the Organization has tended to result in the 
World Health Organization turning away from the traditional treaty-making process 
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towards a more direct procedure in those areas in which it is competent and where 
international action is necessary to lay down international standards and to co-ordinate 
the activities of governments. (Gutteridge 1971:284)
Observing that “the trouble with so many books on international health is that they 
have never been written,” Goodman (1971:394) set out to provide the most complete 
account of international organization and health available to that date. In International 
Health Organizations and Their Work, he provides a history of international health 
cooperation defined as “any or all of those activities for the prevention, diagnosis 
or treatment of disease which require the combined consideration and action of 
more than one country” (1971:3). Unlike previous works, his book considers “other 
influences” on international health work, namely economic, social, political, and 
ideological factors. While he gives a fuller account of the subject, Goodman maintains 
a view of WHO as an essentially technical agency faced with political interference in 
its basic functions: “doctors are doing their job successfully but the politicians, eco-
nomists and sociologists are not” (1971:230). Thus, as in Gutteridge (1971), shortfalls 
in the fulfillment of WHO’s mandate are attributed to technical (i.e., lack of know-
ledge) and nontechnical (i.e., conflict, lack of political will) factors. He concludes: 
“The World Health Organization can hardly be blamed if others fail” (Goodman 
1971:315). Notably, Goodman extends his attention to other intergovernmental agen-
cies concerned with health (i.e., International Labour Organization (ILO), Food and 
Agriculture Organization, UNICEF, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), UN Refugee Agency), and voluntary agencies (e.g., Rockefeller 
Foundation) in his book. In noting the growth in NGOs maintaining official relations 
with WHO between 1949 and 1971, from 13 to over 70, he identifies what would 
become a defining trend towards a highly crowded institutional environment.
Challenging Orthodoxy in International Organization and Health
The analysis of international organization and health as essentially concerned with 
technical, scientific, and administrative functions, in the fulfillment of agreed health 
goals, began to be challenged in the mid-1970s. This is most evident in studies seek-
ing to more fully understand the internal workings of international health organiza-
tions as sites of political processes in themselves. Hoole’s Politics and Budgeting in the 
World Health Organization applies quantitative methods in the study of international 
organization “for the first time” to “determine the manner in which inputs affect 
actions and to evaluate the relative importance of various types of inputs” (1976:21). 
In his detailed analysis of WHO’s budget between 1949 and 1969, for example, Hoole 
observes that the Executive Board “rarely recommended a change in the Director-
General’s budget proposal” and that no significant cuts in the budget had been 
recommended since 1958.
It would be the increased assertiveness of the developing world in the UN, largely 
expressed through the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), that began to challenge how 
international health organizations were studied. For instance, the questioning of 
development models advocating large-scale investment in infrastructure was expressed 
within the health field through the primary health care movement and the adoption 
of the Declaration of Alma Ata at the International Conference on Primary Health 
Care (1978). The declaration challenged Western-defined models of high-technology, 
urban and hospital based health development in favour of bottom–up, community 
based solutions using appropriate, low-cost technologies. The overarching Health for 
All movement was not only a technical strategy, but a political ideology akin to calls 
for a New International Economic Order. Within WHO, this new paradigm took hold 
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at the highest levels, led by Director-General Halfdan Mahler (1976), who stated at 
the World Health Assembly of 1976, “Many social evolutions and revolutions have 
taken place because the social structures were crumbling. There are signs that the 
scientific and technical structures of public health are also crumbling.” Practitioners 
began to call for fundamental reform of health systems, with their embedded struc-
tural inequalities, in such books as Health and the Developing World (Bryant 1969), 
Health by the People (Newell 1975) and Where There Is No Doctor (Werner 1983).
The study of international organization and health during this period reflected this 
paradigmatic shift, with the normative basis of international health organizations 
receiving concerted attention for the first time. In their classic volume The Anatomy 
of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization, Cox and Jacobson seek “to 
understand the sources of influence and the ways influence is exercised by analyzing 
how decisions have been made” (1974:vii) in a number of UN organizations, includ-
ing WHO. Following a familiar description of the agency’s functions, structure, and 
evolution, Jacobson raises questions about patterns of decision making, actors and 
their sources of influence (including the Director-General, staff and representatives 
of other international organizations), and environmental impacts on WHO activities. 
Of particular note is how the organizational ideology of WHO has led to certain 
activities, such as campaigns against specific diseases, and the neglect of others, such 
as the organization of health care services. While dated in substantive content, 
Jacobson’s application of international organization theory to WHO remains the most 
wide-ranging to date.
In a similar challenge to the “infallibility of the traditional medical ethic,” 
C.E. Taylor analyzes “the new style of international health work” which requires 
practitioners “to reassess our underlying values” (1975:489). While debate about the 
appropriate mandate for WHO continued, questions increasingly focused on cri-
tiquing the biomedical approach to such issue areas as family planning (eventually 
shifting the emphasis from population control to reproductive health). Issues of 
whether WHO should be involved in the “health aspects of the population problem,” 
according to Partan, “sharply divided the membership and were abandoned in the 
face of objections that activities in the population field lay outside the proper scope 
of WHO action under its Constitution” (1973:111). Finkle and Crane (1976) attribute 
WHO’s “position toward population and family planning and its role in international 
population assistance” to “the organizational and professional values in the WHO 
Secretariat.” They argue that the emphasis on the technical nature of decisions and 
functions should be recognized, in themselves, as sources of “discretionary power 
from the political interference of member governments and to legitimize the central 
role [of technical expertise] in the WHO policy process.”
Beyond individual international health organizations, scholars began to locate pat-
terns of health and disease within the broader international political economy. In her 
classic text The Political Economy of Health (1979), Lesley Doyal applies Marxist analysis 
to argue that the social construction of health extended to the international level, 
with historical links to imperialism, the rise of capitalism, and neocolonialism. While 
Doyal did not apply her ideas to the analysis of international organization, other 
writers began to explore this avenue. Elling (1981) begins by challenging the notion 
that disease, disability, and death in the developing world are, as regarded by Western 
public health practitioners, problems in “tropical medicine” attributable to geography 
or climate. He describes this perspective as “a very convenient medical/public health 
ideology for the established capitalist political-economic order,” and a distraction from 
the poverty resulting from colonial expropriation. Applying Wallerstein’s concepts 
of periphery and semiperipheral nations in a capitalist world order, and Gramsci’s 
concept of “cultural hegemony,” he directly challenges prevailing explanations of 
health inequalities and the policy solutions put forth by a dominant medical discourse. 
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Using wide-ranging examples, including the marketing of breast-milk substitutes, 
population control, dumping of hazardous waste, and drug policy, Elling offers an 
initial “analysis of a number of health problems [which] highlights the capitalist 
world-system as the fundamental agent in the generation of these problems.” The 
core questions driving his analysis is “What are the mechanisms and ways by which 
this world-system functions to further establish itself and thereby so deleteriously affect 
human health and national health systems” and “how do the active agents of world 
capitalism function to create health problems?” (1981:44 – 5).
The writing of Vicente Navarro also makes a notable contribution to Marxist based 
approaches to international organization and health. His analyses of the health systems 
of Sweden, the US, the UK, and the Soviet Union led him to study health inequalities 
in terms of the structural features of the capitalist world order (Navarro 1980; 1986). 
In his critique of the Brandt Report of 1980, to review international development 
issues, and the Declaration of Alma Ata, he argues that they are located within “the 
socio-economic and political context that determined them.” Like Elling, he identi-
fies an “apolitical and technological-administrative discourse” which upholds the 
“hegemonic development establishments of the Western world.” He also questions its 
“understanding of the causes of underdevelopment and its major health and disease 
problems” (Navarro 1984:467).
Both Elling and Navarro opened up the study of international health, including 
the role of international health organizations, to more critical approaches. While 
their work was characterized by economic determinism, others pursued what might 
be described as early constructivist approaches to international health. A structural/
functional approach is taken by Forbes, who examines “the political economy of 
transnational health organizations, thus illustrating how existing economic analysis 
of international collective action can be adapted and utilized to examine an important, 
albeit neglected, form of international cooperation” (1980:115 – 16). His analysis focuses 
on WHO’s role in the “production of health,” drawing on the economic concepts of 
“pure and impure international public inputs” as a theoretical foundation for discuss-
ing the “institutional design and structure of WHO and transnational health organ-
izations in general” (1980:121). This approach would gain wider attention from the 
late 1990s with the application of the global public goods concept to health policy 
(see below). Forbes concluded that “the array of private, impurely public, and purely 
public inputs, resulting from WHO required the application of the joint product, as 
opposed to pure public good, paradigm of international collective action.” He pro-
posed this as a “useful framework for subsequent research regarding international 
collaboration in public health” (1980:129). Foster (1987b) takes a different approach, 
assessing the nature of behavioral research supported by WHO, attributing its poor 
quality to the physician-dominated review committees that assume “quantitative 
hypothesis-testing investigation is the only acceptable research model.” This, he argues, 
leads to a narrow understanding of behavioral research as limited to information 
on how to change individual and community behavior to conform to the needs of 
health care delivery programmes. He concludes that “research on organization policies 
and programs is viewed as irrelevant and perhaps even threatening” (1987b:709).
As discussed below, the critical study of international organization and health 
remained limited. In part, this was due to the technocratic focus of mainstream pub-
lic health research which eschewed political theory as peripheral to the needs of 
applied research. The surprising neglect of international organization and health by 
international studies also persisted. A notable exception is analyses of the alleged 
“politicization” of UN specialized agencies, including WHO. As a reaction to the 
Declaration of Alma Ata, along with WHO’s adoption of the List of Essential Drugs 
and International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes, the organization was 
accused by the US government of exceeding its technical and scientific mandate. 
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Scholars, in turn, reflected on this debate in terms of functional theory and liberal 
internationalism. In his analysis of the “Problems of the United Nations Specialised 
Agencies at the Quarter Century,” for example, Harrod describes WHO as a “hybrid” 
between an organization supplying technical services, and a forum “to discuss matters 
not essentially transnational” (1974:189 – 90). He discusses the attacks on functionalism 
from realist theory and the rise of nonstate actors, along with emerging approaches 
to development, including Third World nationalism, ecological approaches, and tech-
nical assistance. Finally, Harrod draws attention to the bureaucratic environment of 
the UN, building on the work of Etzioni (1964) to understand “how authority is main-
tained within the organisation” (Harrod 1974:198). He concludes that the “liberal-
internationalist view is being replaced by the real-politik view in which the worth of 
the organisations is assessed exclusively in terms of immediate national interest” 
(1974:203). The perception of WHO, and international health cooperation as a whole, 
as ostensibly technical and even somehow morally above politics thus persisted.
Riggs (1980) interrogates functional theory in his survey of attitudes toward the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and WHO. The core assumption in func-
tionalist thinking, that “good behavior can be learned – that people who become 
personally involved in the work of international agencies will develop attitudes more 
favorable to international cooperation” is tested through mailed questionnaires and 
interviews with individuals who have worked with the organizations. Riggs found that 
“attitudes seem contingent upon the rewardingness of the experience,” in turn affected 
by personal values, domestic organizational milieu, nature of the international organ-
ization, and specifics of the respondent’s experience. Attitudes toward WHO were 
relatively positive, attributed to the perception that “Health Functions are simply less 
controversial” (Riggs 1980:349). He concluded that his findings were “not totally at 
odds with functionalist theorizing, but suggest additional variables that functionalism 
should take into account” (1980:329).
Foster (1987a) raises similar questions in his Weberian analysis of the activities of 
international health organizations as “a function of their structural and dynamic 
characteristics, and of the professional assumptions held by administrators, planners 
and technical specialists.” He characterizes international health organizations as oper-
ating within the “donor-recipient model” of postwar development assistance. Foster 
undertakes perhaps one of the first comparative assessments of multilateral, bilateral, 
and what he distinguishes between private-secular (e.g. Rockefeller Foundation) and 
private-religious (e.g. medical missions) organizations. Among the questions he raises 
are: what are the strengths and weaknesses of international health organizations; does, 
and if so to what extent, the early enunciation of policy doctrines reduce the flexibility 
of international health organizations; and to what extent do professional-personality 
factors impinge on planning processes (Foster 1987a:1047 – 8)?
Acknowledging the world of international organizations as “vast and important,” 
Groom describes UN specialized agencies as “predominantly forum or service organ-
isations.” The former serves “as a meeting place for a discussion of principles but not 
to negotiate the detailed design and undertake the execution of programmes” which 
constitutes the latter. He writes that:
The balance is important for it is likely to have consequences on the budget, size and 
style of the secretariat and the characteristics of the decision-making process. Service 
organisations tend to have larger budgets and secretariats than forum organisations and 
their decision making processes are more likely to emphasise problem-solving by experts 
than bargaining by diplomats. (1988:7 – 8)
While Groom does not specifically analyze WHO in these terms, this tension between 
the forum and service functions succinctly characterizes the tensions that have defined 
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WHO from its creation. The pressure to act as a service organization, largely by 
developing countries, was increasingly unmatched by the resources and authority 
given to it by industrialized countries. This appears supported by Archer, who ques-
tions whether “existing functional organizations such as UNESCO, WHO and ILO 
have been riddled with ideological and racial (or at least North–South) divisions 
which have reflected political arguments outside the organizations, but have neverthe-
less adversely affected their basic work” (1992:94).
Throughout the 1980s, certain select staff of international health organizations 
continued to publish descriptive work of specific programs and policies (Rosenfield 
et al. 1981; Fluss and Gutteridge 1990; 1993). This literature takes stock of challenges 
faced by WHO in different regions and on specific issues. The wide-ranging menu of 
problems identified included the structure of the bureaucracy, budget and financing, 
weak capacity within developing countries, and changing epidemiological patterns of 
health and disease. A notable exception in this literature is a major tome on the 
Smallpox Eradication Programme (Fenner et al. 1988). Nestled within chapters on 
the clinical features of smallpox, and developments in vaccination and disease control 
strategies, is a detailed account of the establishment and conduct of perhaps the most 
notable success story in international cooperation. While atheoretical in its descrip-
tion of policy making within WHO, it serves as a rare example of a detailed discussion 
of how international health cooperation was conducted amid diverse and competing 
interests.
Interest in the politics of international health grew rapidly during the 1980s, with 
high profile initiatives on baby milk and essential drugs, with much of this work 
produced by social scientists working within the public health field. For example, the 
work of Reich applies basic political concepts, such as power and influence, to map 
specific international health policies. In his paper on the politics and economics of 
essential drugs, he notes:
A new pattern has emerged for setting the agenda of international health issues, with 
open participation in international organizations by industry associations and by consumer 
groups. This pattern is still evolving, but it represents a significant change and poses a 
complex challenge to the leadership of international agencies. The more open participa-
tion also raises questions about whose interests are being represented and whose interests 
should be represented at agencies such as the WHO. (1987:55)
One of the few analyses from within international studies of international organiza-
tion and heath during this period is a study by Mingst (1990:228n), who notes that 
previous research on WHO is surprisingly limited, especially in view of the alleged 
success of the organization, as well as the recent appearance of several controversial 
issues on its agenda. In her study of relations between WHO and the US government, 
she focuses on the former’s information gathering role. She argues that the US 
government has pursued a “strategy of adaptation”:
This approach is designed to enable the United States to maintain a lower profile, thereby 
stifling charges of US manipulation of the organization and fortifying WHO’s own legit-
imacy. American officials have worked more behind the scenes to convince countries 
to support specific measures, building coalitions rather than using threats or financial 
leverage. (Mingst 1990:219)
She argues that this has been possible because of “the organizational characteristics 
of WHO, including the technical orientation of the secretariat, transgovernmental 
networks, and the political savvy of its directors-general and other members” (1990:224). 
Similarly, Sikkink (1986) analyzes the politics concerning the adoption of the 
International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes, and observes that “[t]he 
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perception of WHO as a technical and professional organization with low politiciza-
tion increased the impact of consensual scientific knowledge.”
Reform of International Organization and Health
From the 1980s, growing competition among UN organizations for scarce resources 
within the international health field resulted in the study of international organiza-
tion and health extending beyond WHO. For example, while WHO and UNICEF 
cosponsored the Declaration of Alma Ata, differences in their interpretation of the 
most appropriate way of achieving Health for All soon became apparent. The clear 
tension between comprehensive and selective primary health care (Walsh and Warren 
1979) brought to light the increasing political competition among UN organizations 
for donor funding. Maggie Black’s two books on UNICEF (1986; 1996) provided the 
first detailed accounts of the creation of the UN fund and the development of its 
activities. This was followed by Beigbeder’s book (2002), whose analysis delves beyond 
programs, structure, and finances to examine the challenges UNICEF faces in defining 
its identity and relationships with other international organizations.
A spate of assessments of international health organizations, largely from within 
the public health field, were undertaken from the early 1990s. In part, this was due 
to dissatisfaction among major donor countries with the performance of WHO under 
Director-General Hiroshi Nakajima. Major aid donors funded several studies which 
reviewed the activities, funding, and, given the growth of international health activ-
ities, division of labour among international health organizations. The Nordic UN 
Project (1991), for instance, included a study of UN specialized agencies (including 
WHO). It attributes contemporary problems to the shift from traditional normative 
and informative roles to technical cooperation activities with developing countries. 
The study focuses on the operational capabilities of WHO, in terms of the changing 
nature of technical cooperation, and identifies functions the organization might best 
perform (Stenson and Sterky 1994; Sterky et al. 1996). In 1991, the Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA) commissioned its own review of 11 multilateral 
agencies, including an analysis of the “Effectiveness of Multilateral Agencies at Country 
Level: WHO in Kenya, Nepal, Sudan and Thailand.” The study seeks to understand 
the “comparative advantages” across agencies at the country level and considered, in 
particular, whether WHO “managed to formulate and support a set of activities 
(projects and programmes) that are relevant to the present needs of the country” 
(DANIDA 1991:2). Based on field visits, discussions with agency staff, review of policy 
and project documents, the study takes a program evaluation approach to assess 
administrative and technical effectiveness. It recommends “a fundamental review of 
the role and mode of WHO’s regional offices,” given a “too politicised organizational 
structure,” and “a strengthening of its non-medical, professional resources” in the 
form of health management and capacity-building expertise. The theme of country 
level presence would later be taken up by another multidonor review (Australia, 
Canada, Norway, Sweden, and the UK) of WHO activities in 12 countries (Lucas 
et al. 1997).
The proliferation of health-related activities by different UN organizations, as well 
as bilateral aid agencies, became a particular focus of public health research during 
this period. Walt (1993) published the first detailed analysis of the changing context 
of international health cooperation from the 1940s, in the form of major shifts in 
financing and activities, and “an increasingly political milieu.” Lee et al. (1996) raise 
the normative question of who should be doing what in international health, mapping 
out formal and effective mandates, resources, and comparative advantages. At the 
same time, donor concerns about “value for money” led to a multidonor study (UK, 
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Australia, and Norway) of WHO finances (Vaughan et al. 1996). Operating since 1980 
under a donor-imposed policy of zero real growth (and later zero nominal growth), 
WHO faced increasingly severe pressure to focus its limited resources more effectively. 
Based on detailed review of budget and program documents, and semistructured 
interviews, the study confirmed the need for the organization to strengthen priority 
setting. Importantly, it undertook groundbreaking analysis of the shift from regular 
budget to extrabudgetary (voluntary) funds, with the latter giving donors a stronger 
(and uncoordinated) voice over agenda setting. The study highlighted for the first 
time the mutual responsibility of international health organizations and donor coun-
tries for the serious problem of poor coordination and overlapping mandates. Koivusalo 
and Ollila (1997), commissioned by the Finnish Ministry of Health, compare the 
organizational structures, finances, accountability, policies, and cooperative arrange-
ments of various UN organizations concerned with health. Finally, a hard-hitting series 
by Fiona Godlee in the influential British Medical Journal levelled unprecedented 
criticism at WHO, pointing to problems of efficiency and effectiveness, as well as 
nepotism, bureaucratic waste, and weak leadership (Godlee 1994a; 1994b; 1994c; 
1994d). While journalistic rather than scholarly in style, the series captured the loss 
of confidence in the mid-1990s in the lead role of WHO in international health 
cooperation, a subject that would prompt ongoing debate (Brown et al. 2006; Lee 
and Buse 2006).
The ascendance of the World Bank as a major institutional player in interna-
tional health became the subject of growing scholarly attention from the early 1990s. 
The substantial financing provided by the Bank for health development prompted 
questions about its political influence (Buse and Gwin 1998; Abbasi 1999). The con-
troversial impacts of structural adjustment programs and policy conditionality on 
health in low- and middle-income countries prompted critiques of the neoliberal 
ideology underpinning the Bank’s policies. This signaled a revival of critical approaches 
to the study of international health cooperation, focusing not only on operational 
issues, but on the normative basis of international health policy (Sanders and Chopra 
2003).
The Shift from International to Global Health
The prescient call by Thomas (1989) for concerted attention by international rela-
tions scholars to health issues began to be heeded in the mid-1990s, first, as part of 
the rapidly growing study of global governance, which soon acknowledged the inno-
vative changes taking place within health. Second, the end of the Cold War shifted 
attention to nontraditional security issues which embraced selected health issues.
The politics of international health, in terms of state influence over policy making, 
remained one analytical focus. Siddiqi’s World Health and World Politics evaluates “the 
influence of political and other factors on the WHO’s effectiveness in its efforts to 
achieve universal membership, a workable decentralized structure and the eradication 
of malaria.” Seeking to redress “the non-medical analyses of programmes and pol-
icies,” he challenges the assumption by functional theory that “politics can be segre-
gated from the technical or ‘apolitical’ work of an organization like the WHO,” and 
that the failure to do so results in ineffectiveness (1995:41). Dividing politics into 
four realms (positive, inevitable, legitimate, and negative politics), he argues that 
politicization specifically concerns “negative politics,” defined as that “category of 
politics which results in the consideration of extraneous issues such as those concern-
ing security and power-politics within the confines of a specialized agency like the 
WHO” (1995:51). He concludes that politics should be seen not simply as interfering 
with international health cooperation, but embedded within its very nature. A similar 
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recognition of the importance of interstate relations is the focus of Panisset’s study 
of the Peruvian cholera epidemic of the 1990s (2000:14). Adopting a utilitarian 
approach, he puts forth a model of “international health statecraft” for use by foreign 
and health policy makers to analyze and respond to international health issues.
A recognition of the politically “volatile atmosphere” (Siddiqi 1995:5 – 6) of inter-
national health cooperation is also the starting point for a growing number of studies 
concerned with why the health needs of certain population groups and issues receive 
priority while others do not (Shiffman et al. 2002). For example, Muraskin’s The 
Politics of International Health: The Children’s Vaccine Initiative and the Struggle to Develop 
Vaccines for the Third World (1998) is the first detailed account of how political rivalry 
among international health organizations has shaped child immunization campaigns. 
Shiffman (2006:419) raises similar questions comparing funding from donor organ-
izations for dealing with 20 communicable diseases with the affected numbers of 
people (as calculated by the Global Burden of Disease Project). Within the context 
of chronic underfunding for dealing with communicable diseases in the developing 
world, he concludes that “many funding decisions [are] based on the disease targeted, 
influenced by industrialized world interests and priorities of the moment. The result 
will be ongoing competition among diseases for attention. This dynamic makes 
continued research and monitoring of funding patterns essential.”
Kaddar et al. (2004:697) reach a similar conclusion in their economic analysis of 
the financing of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI). The 
authors describe a financially sustainable approach to overcome how “funding in poor 
countries is often at risk and subject to the political whims of donors and national 
governments.”
Equally, the shift in focus to nontraditional security issues in the mid-1990s allowed 
scholars to explore more fully the convergence between international organization 
and health. Graphic journalistic-style accounts of Ebola, Marburg and Lassa Fever 
outbreaks (Garrett 1994; Preston 1998) and revelations about the former Soviet Union’s 
offensive biological weapons program (Alibeck and Handelman 2000) resulted in 
emerging infectious diseases and the threat of bioterrorism gaining new prominence 
(Henderson 1999; Fidler 1999). The realization that potentially any population – 
including that of any Western developed nation – was now at risk, combined with 
new conceptual frameworks based on the notion of “human security” (Chen et al. 
2003), encouraged the change from “international” to “global” thinking, leading 
Fidler and Gostin (2008) to conclude:
The biological weapons threat has forced states, intergovernmental organizations, and 
non-state actors to build more comprehensive and complex strategies to protect against 
the proliferation and use of biological weapons. Similarly, traditional approaches to 
infectious diseases proved inadequate as microbial dangers grew in scope and seriousness. 
These dangers prompted policy makers to engage in the securitization of public health 
and to embark on unprecedented efforts to remake global surveillance and intervention 
policies.
Indeed, as the political nature of international organization and health has been 
more fully explored by scholars (Kickbusch 2002), the role of nonstate actors is 
increasingly recognized. Reminiscent of Sikkink (1986), the interaction of state and 
nonstate actors at the 1992 International Conference on Population and Development 
attracted attention because of the influential role of transnational policy networks of 
women’s health organizations (Finkle and McIntosh 1994). By the late 1990s, the 
significant role of nonstate actors in international health led Lee (1998) and others 
to apply the concept of “global governance” to the study of international organization 
and health. Of particular interest has been the innovative nature of institutional 
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arrangements that have been established, bringing together new combinations of 
state, private, and civil society organizations (Dodgson et al. 2002). The prominent 
role of civil society organizations in the negotiation of the WHO Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control, for example, is analyzed by Collin et al. (2002) as an example 
of the shift from international to global health governance (GHG). Finally, the sub-
stantial resources of large charitable trusts such as the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation have come under greater scrutiny in terms of their influence on decision 
making and authority within GHG (Moran 2008).
The popularity of global public–private health partnerships (GHPs) has received 
particular attention within the GHG literature. Seeking to make sense of these new 
institutional arrangements, Buse and Walt (2000a; 2000b) classify GHPs in terms of 
their functions as product based, product development based, and issues/systems 
based. Similarly, Nishtar (2004:5) organizes such arrangements by six purposes, and 
explores the complex ethical and process-related challenges created by the “transna-
tional nature of some of these partnership arrangements.” As such arrangements have 
rapidly grown in number, some criticize their uncritical use, ideological basis, and 
compromise of core public health values (Richter 2004). In recent years, attention 
has turned to assessing how such arrangements can best contribute to global health 
goals. Trow and Reich (2002) examine the organizational and ethical challenges of 
product based GHPs, and explore such questions as how organizations with different 
values, interests, and worldviews come together to resolve critical public health issues; 
how shared objectives and shared values are created within a partnership; and how 
relationships of trust are fostered and sustained in the face of the inevitable conflicts, 
uncertainties, and risks of partnership. The authors draw lessons from successful 
partnerships as well as troubled ones in order to help guide efforts to reduce global 
health disparities. In a similar way, Buse and Harmer assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of GHPs, identifying “seven habits many GHPs practice that result in sub-
optimal performance and negative externalities,” and developing “a simple assessment 
mechanism [. . .] to score GHPs on a biennial basis on their performance across a 
range of indicators” (Buse and Harmer 2007:259, 270).
The role of relevant institutional actors formally outside of the health sector has 
been the subject of growing scholarship. The impact of the World Trade Organization, 
for example, and its trade policies such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) prompted scholars such as Bettcher et al. (2000) 
and Trouiller et al. (2002) to question the appropriateness and influence of market-
driven forces on global public health. Reminiscent of Navarro and others, who locate 
international health policy within a capitalist world order, for example, Schrecker et 
al. (2007) argue for the promotion of health equity within global governance more 
broadly. The increased funding given by the Group of Eight (G8) countries, for 
example, has been critically reviewed by Labonte et al. (2004) and Kirton et al. (2009), 
who compare funding commitments with actual disbursements. The question of how 
global health fares within the world trading system is also addressed by Fidler et al. 
(2009) and Lee et al. (2009), who review the global governance of the two realms in 
terms of institutional mechanisms, policy making processes, and policy coherence.
As well as assessing these individual contributions to GHG, attention has been given 
to how this increasingly complex institutional environment contributes collectively to 
GHG. Such analyses go beyond issues of the efficiency and effectiveness of specific 
institutional arrangements, to assessing the quality of governance they represent. For 
example, Sidibe et al. conclude that the GFATM “must seek to foster an environment 
and procedures for public and mutual accountability, involving North and South, 
non-state and parliamentary actors” (2006:500). Similarly, as part of their assessment 
of “public health in the new era,” Beaglehole et al. call on public health practitioners 
“to understand the political nature of the process of developing health policy and act 
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accordingly” (2004:2086). In this sense, scholars have shifted to analyzing how to raise 
the quality of politics rather than exclude it from an assumed apolitical issue area. 
Key questions concern the balance of power among institutional players, notably 
vis-à-vis WHO, in terms of resources, authority, and responsibility (Silberschmidt et al. 
2008). To what extent does the proliferation of institutional actors in global health 
reflect greater democratization or elitism in GHG? Are emerging forms of GHG 
contributing positively or negatively to global health inequities?
While a substantial literature has emerged on the numerous and diverse institutional 
actors concerned with global health, a further approach has been to understand the 
functional needs to be achieved through collective action, amid a shift from interna-
tional to global health. The prolific work of David Fidler is prominent in this respect 
for documenting the legal dimensions of GHG in general, and in relation to specific 
issue areas. He is among the earliest writers to frame emerging infectious diseases 
(EIDs) as a problem in international relations, and the need “to measure the impact 
infectious diseases have on international relations, but also to consider how the nature 
of the international system itself contributes to the global problem of EIDs” (Fidler 
1997:810). Case studies edited by Lee (2003b) describe how globalization is impacting 
on health and the global governance responses needed to address them, while other 
contributors (Taylor 2002; Gostin 2004; Aginam 2005) expand on the role of inter-
national law in both shaping and facilitating global public health collaboration. 
Similarly, the concept of global public goods for health seeks to apply the basic eco-
nomic concepts of public goods to identify core functions that international health 
cooperation should seek to provide in the face of market failure (Smith et al. 2003). 
More recent works have built on this early analyses (Cooper et al. 2009; Zacher and 
Keefe 2008). For example, Cooper et al. (2007) write:
Recently global health issues have leapt to the forefront of the international agenda and 
are now an everyday concern around the world. The war for global health is clearly being 
lost on many fronts and the massive body count is mounting fast. Re-emerging diseases 
such as polio and tuberculosis, long thought to be on the verge of elimination, are now 
coupled with the devastation of newly emerging ones such as SARS and avian influenza. 
In addition, the shock of bioterrorism has given a tragic poignancy to the importance 
of studying the failure of the global health governance system [. . .] [T]his volume stud-
ies the global challenges and responses to these issues, as well as the roles of central 
institutions such as WHO, the World Trade Organization and the G8.
The starting point for such analyses is a key issue area, such as infectious disease 
control or access to essential medicines, and the existing institutional mechanisms 
for protecting and promoting human health are then assessed.
Fidler has also been prominent in the analysis of health using a security lens. While 
Price-Smith (2001; 2002) and others (Rodier et al. 2007) have argued that infectious 
diseases, in particular, constitute part of a post–Cold War and post–9/11 “new security 
agenda,” Fidler (2003) explores the different meanings of security and the normative 
basis for linking the health and security policy agendas. This approach is also taken 
by Elbe (2006), Feldbaum et al. (2006), and others (McInnes and Lee 2005; 2006; 
Davies 2008; Aldis 2008) who explore the political reasons for the securitization of 
health issues, such as HIV/AIDS (Ostergard 2007), and the implications for ethics, 
policy, and practice.
Future Directions
The bulk of scholarship on international organization and health continues to be 
produced from outside the formal disciplinary boundaries of international relations. 
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This literature, primarily from the perspective of public health, is understandably 
concerned with improving the contemporary institutional mechanisms for addressing 
collective health problems. Moreover, such analyses have often been undertaken by 
individuals straddling additional roles as practitioners, policy makers, or advocates. 
While insightful of the practical challenges facing international organization and health, 
such works tend to be what Strong (1986) describes as “technocratic, ahistorical, 
apolitical and unreflexive.”
The recent growth of attention to global health by international relations scholars 
suggest opportunities to broaden the perspectives undertaken to date. Building on 
the work of medical historians (Weindling 1995; Packard 1998) and legal scholars 
(Fidler 2001; Aginam 2005), there is need to locate the history of international health 
cooperation more fully within the history of international organization as a whole.
The politics of international organization and health is now well established, not 
simply as an external interference in the technical workings of intrinsically scientific 
bodies, but as embedded within their very nature. Fuller analyses of politics within 
the numerous and diverse institutional actors in global health – how politics is defined 
and measured, distributed and used – are warranted. How does politics, in turn, shape 
individual and collective policies and actions? How is contemporary politics shaping 
the emerging nature of GHG? From such analyses, the broader question of what 
international organization and health tells us about emerging forms of global govern-
ance can be raised. For example, what do innovations in international health co-
operation tell us about the shifting boundaries between the state, market, and civil 
society? What is the quality of global governance as provided by these diverse institu-
tional actors? Admittedly, while the recent shift in the literature to exploring “how” 
international organizations matter (Koremenos et al. 2001) and the role of delegation 
and agency (Hawkins et al. 2006) has prompted some preliminary, albeit competing 
views on the WHO’s recent activities (Cortell and Peterson 2006; Kamradt-Scott, 2009), 
it is simply the case that more analysis, both beyond WHO and in terms of the volume 
of quality research, is required.
In this sense, there is broad scope for a more critical study of international organ-
ization and health. To date, such approaches have been marginalized by a strong 
emphasis on problem solving. The long debated problems of overlapping mandates, 
poor coordination, and unclear leadership remain relevant and, indeed, more so 
amid the proliferation of GHPs and other institutional arrangements. Critical analysis 
should seek to deepen understanding of this complex institutional context, not as 
administrative or operational challenges, but as manifestations of different discourses 
or worldviews shaping GHG (Lee and Zwi 1996). How do different paradigms deter-
mine what issues and interests are addressed and neglected? What is the normative 
nature of health knowledge? How are embedded power relations influencing thought 
and action on global health? In this way, critical approaches to international organ-
ization and health will reveal deeper insights into the nature of emerging global 
health issues and the institutional responses to them.
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